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Abstract 
Equal employment is one of the most important and problematic questions of the labour market and of employment law as well. 
Within Europe we should pay special attention to the practice of the Court of Justice of the European Union because of its 
general legal practice. The study describes new cases which represent the development of equal treatment. Furthermore, special 
attention is paid to the European Convention on Human Rights emphasizing that this question cannot be described only from the 
point of view of labour law. The final conclusion is that the Court is in a difficult situation when judging correctly a labour law 
discrimination case since it has to take into consideration several aspects which interpretation is not united in the European labour 
law. 
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1. Introduction 
Equal employment first of all means the equality between certain employees or groups of employees that should 
be fulfilled and ensured. Namely, the employer – neither the legislator nor the judicature in wider sense – should not 
differentiate between persons illegally, without cause, disproportionately or arbitrarily. It is also the task of the 
certain labour law norms and other legal branches of a certain legal system, and also the courts or even the 
authorities play a great part in ensuring equality.  
Typically, discrimination is based on the certain employee’s personal attributes (gender, age, religion, colour, 
social position, origin etc), that’s why prohibition of discrimination is of high importance, since in a situation when 
an employee suffers concrete infringement or disadvantage (e.g. her/his legal relationship is terminated illegally, 
she/he gets less wage for the same work, she/he is not applied because of her/his age) she/he – in case of a group, 
they – suffer infringement from two directions. On the one hand, it is obvious that she/he suffers injury in a sense of 
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some labour or social law what is typically connected to her/his employment situation or will have great effect on it. 
I would like to add that if someone suffers employment disadvantage, it is the base of discrimination while she/he 
has no disadvantage as a consequence of some other concrete attribute.  
On the other hand, it is clear that this kind of infringement – even it is the responsibility of the state or the 
employer in a concrete case – also hurts the employee’s personal rights, they are also infringed in some way. Of 
course, it can be traced back to human dignity as fundamental human right (Szemesi, 2007), since the base of 
equality between employees is being treated with equal dignity (Szemesi, 2008). But in most of the cases no 
attention is paid to this aspect in the legal practice. Later it will be interpreted in detail. 
The depository of this developing process is the Court of Justice of the European Union (in the following: 
Court), since it has interpreted and still interprets this concept in several judgments (Gyulavári & Könczei, 2000). 
Though the Court often encounters difficulties during this activity, but EU institutions (the legislature institutions) 
and the Member States are bound by these judgments since the Court makes special case law. It is a kind of 
contradiction that only the Court itself is not bound by these judgments. Otherwise, the Court – as it was mentioned 
earlier – is not alone during its legal interpretation and legal development, since several courts in the Member States 
in many respects even involuntarily assist the Court in solving a certain legal problem, and in developing the 
concept of equality for long term. 
2. The criteria of employees’ comparability 
The basis of the practice of the Court is the concept of comparability and its interpretation. According to the 
concept of the regulation to examine whether a certain rule or employer’s measure or regulation violates the 
prohibition of discrimination can be examined only among such persons or groups that are in comparable situation 
regarding their most important subjective and objective attributes (Szemesi, 2009). At the same time I would like to 
add that though this kind of approach has refined and changed during the years, it is still the basis of the 
discrimination test (Hős, 2010), since the Court in the cases where comparability does not exist unambiguously but 
stating discrimination seems to be justified, declared that the similar situation itself can be enough to state 
discrimination. The latter quasi permissive rule is quite opposite of the comparability criteria and standard worked 
out by the Court earlier. It should be added that the Court tries to avoid decision making on the basis of similar 
situation, or at least not exclusively based on this. 
It is worth thinking whether in the practice of the Court (in accordance with the governing statutes) the 
requirement of comparability narrows the interpretation regarding which employees are protected against 
discrimination by legal instruments and which are not. It is undisputed that the Court’s interpretation of the 
requirement of comparability earlier than 30 years ago is still correct and the application of this concept is 
necessary. This field is not other than one of the most typical problems within the sphere of equal treatment, the 
principle of equal pay (Gyulavári & Könczei, 2000). Namely, when the Court has to judge in such a case where the 
legal situation is questionable because two or more employees do not get the same wage for the same or similar 
work, it must be defined inevitably whether the works done or the working spheres or the assumed positions are 
similar to such an extent that they could be compared or can they be compared on the basis of other objective 
aspects that solid consideration would be made referring to the questions of waging (Gyulavári & Könczei, 2000). It 
must be emphasized that the requirement of equal treatment should be fulfilled in connection with much more 
questions in connection with employment relationship, and at first sight it can be regarded discretional if questions 
of discrimination depend on only comparability. In other words, while in the question of pay it would be impossible 
to judge about advantages and disadvantages without real comparison, it is not sure that the formula of 
comparability can always be applied in other – perhaps independent from it – questions of remuneration (e.g. in case 
of termination of employment relationship based on pregnancy). As a consequence of the Court’s legal practice it is 
clear that while examining equal pay – typically – it definitely insists on the criteria of comparability, but in other 
discrimination cases it only refers to it and often ignores it. Anyway its standpoint is consequent in this respect.   
It is unambiguous that when the Court has to decide whether a certain employee’s right to equality was infringed 
because of her/his personal attributes (age or employment situation) it is not indispensable to compare the given 
person or group with the others in similar situation since because of the origin from the right to human dignity as 
fundamental law type mentioned earlier, the prohibition of discrimination also has an „absolute value” in the system 
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of entitlements for persons in general, and for the employees. Namely, if a certain person is discriminated in a way 
or deprived from advantage, it is not sure that this depends on some other persons’ situation. This kind of 
comparability is not the same as the problems of the same and different situations in connection with discrimination. 
In my opinion the Court is restricted in a way by the criteria of comparability but at the same time makes judgement 
itself basically easier and more objective. On examining the certain cases closely we can understand how the Court 
applies comparability for a certain case.  
3. Standards of differentiation and proportionality 
Regarding the entirety of the EU legal system it can be stated that one of its most important fundamental 
principles is proportionality (Várnay & Papp, 2010), so it is worth mentioning it as a kind of standard applied by the 
Court (Hős, 2010). This principle – or proportionality test in the practice of the Court (Weber, 1995) – is important 
not only from the point of certain regulating questions and judging methods, but regarding certain rights, mainly 
basic rights for the Union citizens it should be interpreted. Of course, legal differentiation is necessary, furthermore, 
during applying advantageous treatment it is very important in such cases when the Court has to balance whether a 
given employer measure – regarding the aim to be achieved – is proportionate or not (Szemesi, 2009). Its role in the 
anti-discrimination cases is indisputable, it is enough to think of whether in a given case the different treatment is 
proportionate with the aim to be achieved by the measure. The application of the proportionality test is self-evident 
in the basic law questions, since it may be a problem whether to what extent the law in dispute is due to certain 
persons in a given life situation. In my opinion its main reason is that if a basic law with restriction coincides to 
another without restriction, then the Court has to solve the contradiction whether in the given case which concrete 
laws are deserved by the Union citizen. All these are also true in the case of restricting the laws (Hős, 2010). 
The proportionality test was introduced into the legal practice of the „gowned board” in Luxembourg in 
connection with the cases of gender discrimination, and its basis were laid down in the 1980s. Two important facts 
should be stated, since the application of the proportionality test – mainly in clearance cases – is quite disputable, 
the practice testifies that not quite consequent. However, the legal interest behind it and the aim are definitely 
progressive and commendable. On the one hand, it can be stated that the proportionality test has been worked out as 
a result of a special interaction, namely, as an interaction of the principle of equal treatment as means of protecting 
the employees’ rights and the interests – that may be contrary to them – of the Member States or employers. It may 
be a good example of it that during the termination of the employment contract indisputable interests collide when 
the employer intends to terminate it because of a reason typically in the functioning or economic sphere but the 
employer disregards prohibition of discrimination. Naturally, in this case termination is illegal if it is justified on the 
employee’s side that she/he was dismissed not because of some economic but some protected personal attribute 
reason. Neither can be disregarded the fact that the accidental necessity of the employer measure is really justified 
and in this case it would be inequitable to state it illegal referring „only” to discrimination. There are parallel 
situations to this logically when the employees in disadvantageous or more disadvantageous situation intend to refer 
to discrimination quasi as the „winning card”. One of the important functions of the proportionality test is to aid the 
Court to separate legal and illegal discrimination (Szemesi, 2010). What is more, in many cases it can be observed 
that it is applied by the Court in case of the existence or non-existence of the emerged disadvantage or infringement 
and referring to its reality. Furthermore, it is noteworthy in the current judgments of the Court that more and more 
attention is paid to certain aspects of the labour market.  
The other aspect is rather methodological, since the Court prefers to the proportionality examination mainly 
during the examination of indirect discrimination (Hős, 2010). It means that the possibility of exculpation is being 
examined mainly in such cases only. In my opinion this viewpoint is not quite compatible with the principle of equal 
treatment or with the dogmatics of legal discrimination. In a certain case indirect discrimination may be 
proportionate, let’s think of those cases in which the employers do not intend to apply a certain person because of 
physical or mental disability. In such cases the applicant legally can refer to suffering disadvantage because of some 
personal attribute, mainly it is obvious that the applicant has this attribute (e.g. being female). In my opinion the 
differentiation itself could be the object of the proportionality test.  
Mainly the criteria of „appropriateness and necessity that is defined in 2000/78/EC and mentioned in several 
directives should be examined in this sense. The Court points out that the general clarification system of criteria 
defined by the directive, and the special situations in certain cases (e.g. in the cases of employment of women, aged 
or disabled people) do not coincidence necessarily. Namely, even if the impeached person can excuse 
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herself/himself according to the general rules, it is not sure that she/he will be excused from the obligation totally. 
Instead, the proportionality test should take into consideration the general and concrete circumstances of a case on 
valuing differentiation. It can be said that both the principle and the test try to balance the two sides, namely, the 
situation of the person suffered disadvantage and the person who caused the disadvantage. In other words, this 
procedure can be defined as a kind of „life jacket” on the employer’s side. But it could be applied efficiently only if 
the standard would be unified and its aspects would be declared and objective.  
4. The fundamental human right to equal treatment with special attention to the European Convention on 
Human Rights 
In the final part I am over viewing in short the method of legal interpretation which often makes more difficult 
for the Court to make correct decision but at the same time it regards the protection of employees’ rights one of the 
most important approaches.  
Undoubtedly, in most of the cases the Court needs preterhuman efforts and great creativity to solve these legal 
cases. To make judgment is not easy and in my opinion the Court copes with the task with changing effectiveness 
but mostly successful. However, it may be problematic what can be regarded successful referring to the solutions; 
namely, to cope with the requirements of equal treatment in cases is almost impossible (Weber, 1995). Mainly, if we 
take base the approach from the point of fundamental human right. 
As I mentioned earlier in the judgments the Court cites mainly the referring directives, its own previous 
judgments and the Basic Treaties. It is indisputable that – as the Court also admits it – these sources are not always 
enough to decide lawsuits, or to be more correct, we can say that the Court intends to exclude any doubt if it is 
possible. In my opinion the Court typically uses three sources which do not belong to the classical EU legal system, 
but keeping in mind the prohibition of discrimination in general the Court often relies on them as follows: European 
Social Charter, European Convention on Human Rights (in the following: ECHR) and the content of the common 
constitutional tradition of the Member States (Trócsányi & Badó, 2005). These three special legal sources could be 
the subject of another essay, but regarding the subject of this study I would like to introduce some relevant 
connections of the ECHR. 
The Court’s decisions and their legal messages often seem to be rather uncertain because they are not consistent. 
That’s why the Court so often refers to the „unseen constitution” of the EU, namely, to the common constitutional 
tradition of the Member States. In my opinion in this uncertain situation it is correct that the Court refers to the 
ECHR as an international convention of fundamental human rights, since it definitely intends to ensure the 
prohibition of discrimination from the viewpoints of basic rights. The relationship between the ECHR and the EU 
legal order is of high importance, since the ECHR itself and the Lisbon Treaty made possible for the EU to join it 
(Szemesi, 2009), and the ECHR and the EU legal order can get into close contact soon (discussions are being held at 
present). I think it is important that though the EU definitely intends to ensure the fundamental human rights for its 
citizens – let’s think of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, which is an immanent element of 
the Treaties since 1st December 2009 – but the ECHR and the activity of the European Court of Human Rights 
promotes the basic law protection also in the case law of the Court. 
Nevertheless the requirement of equal treatment – regarding the employees, or any person in general – has a 
serious legal background so much that it must be regarded as the one of the most important fundamental human 
rights today. Consequently, when the Court definitely refers to the fundamental human right it is traced back to basic 
right of human dignity, which is a fundamental right without restriction (Jeney, 2002). This method can be regarded 
to be correct, but in its further development Article 14 of the ECHR should play a major role. According to this 
article prohibition of discrimination means that the rights and freedom declared in the Agreement must be ensured 
without any discrimination, e.g. gender, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social 
origin, national minority, financial situation, birth or other situation.  
The Court points out in several cases of such object that the fundamental human right to prohibition of 
discrimination – in the classical sense – is qualified for outlining the parties’ margin. Typically, if in a certain life 
situation a certain employee is being treated differently because of some reason than the other employees in a 
comparable situation, it must be clear to what extent the differentiation is legal, namely, to what extent the 
employer’s   decision-making autonomy  grows.  Conversely, it can be seen that the employee – the person who 
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suffers disadvantage because of some of her/his attribute or situation – how can perform against discrimination. If 
the Court judges the life situation that discrimination was legal, we cannot speak about either employment or human 
discrimination.  
At this point I would like to refer to the ideas interpreted in connection with employees’ equality with the 
provision to the fact that the Court refers to the protection of fundamental human rights not necessarily only in the 
meaning discussed just now. That is, in some cases it would mean superfluous and disproportionate restriction of the 
fundamental right to equality, in case prohibition of discrimination would be interpreted as defining the parties’ 
autonomy. It can be gathered from the Court’s several decisions and from the Member States’ common 
constitutional tradition that the prohibition of illegal different treatment between persons must be traced back to the 
fundamental right to human dignity, which is without restriction. So, the Court has to examine whether a certain 
measure or restriction mean such legal injury on the employee’s side which infringes her/his right to be treated 
equal. It is obvious that not all types of discrimination cause infringement of human rights, but the Court cannot 
interpret unambiguously where the limit of this infringement of human right is.  But it is clear that the Court intends 
to apply this kind of approach on solving a case in connection with equal opportunities, mainly in the interest of the 
protection of the employees’ personal integrity. This way the Court tries to give the most possible protection for the 
employees. 
The Court during the proceeding must take into consideration the above mentioned requirements, but in respect 
to what basis can this fundamental law protection be put is not unambiguous. It is unambiguous that in the domestic 
law of the Member States regarding the prohibition of discrimination the final, this way the most important 
guarantees for the persons’ equal treatment are the constitution that contains the fundamental rights and the 
constitutional practice. Basically, it is a guarantee aspect and it is very important because of the direct refer to 
human rights (Sólyom, 2001). But the situation in the legal system of the EU is different. In spite of the more and 
more intensive pursuits the EU does not have an own constitution (Várnay & Papp, 2010), in spite of the definite 
basic law aspect of the Basic Treaties, the above mentioned protection level is missing. This way in those cases 
(their number is continuously growing) where the Court – in connection with ensuring equal treatment – refers to the 
fundamental human right to equality, is often left unaided. And here comes the ECHR, it is true that it is not a EU 
legal instrument regarding the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (in which concrete reference to 
the Agreement in the text can be found) the Court refers to such cases more and more bolder. Although, the situation 
is not so obvious if we think of cases where a legal dispute as a consequence of a simple infringement at workplace 
leads to citing human rights before the Court what seems to be rather exaggerated.     
The Court in its legal practice likes to strengthen its own – often original or self-repeating – standpoint from 
several aspects. The recognition itself that the employees should be protected from fundamental right view is a 
commendable step toward a more effective system of legal protection. Dogmatically the system is interesting 
because the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union itself refers to the ECHR directly, but from 
methodological view as far as the special legal sources refer to other legal sources which are basically important 
then these special further legal sources have very important roles.  It is clear that in fundamental law approach the 
Court draws on Article 14, e.g. on over viewing the conceptual elements of the persons’ equality (Szemesi, 2009). 
Its importance is not less hereinafter even if it is applied for a specific group, the employees, than the European 
Court of Human Rights itself judges in cases in connection with human rights. Furthermore, the Court referred to the 
ECHR in discrimination cases in judgments before 1st December 2009 disregarding the step what the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union embodies.   
Finally, I would like to turn attention to an important circumstance. Exceedingly, the Court intends to keep its 
own abstraction on practical level, it prefers deciding legal disputes in connection with employment equality by the 
aid of ideas expressed on theoretical level. Referring to this the Court decides several legal disputes which affect the 
employees’ rights in a special way that they originate from the fundamental principles of the EU law, basic legal 
principles (Kalas, 2001) and return to them.  However, in the cases of judgments on basic principle level the 
elements beyond the legal order, namely, those included in the ECHR also have important role. Undoubtedly, the 
ECHR both on theoretical and practical level – even if indirectly – is applied in the Luxembourg legal practice. 
5. Conclusion 
I have over viewed only some of the methods and principles applied by the Court, but I think that we can define 
conclusions which are important both from theoretical and practical aspects. Obviously, the Court does not have a 
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good pattern for cases of equal treatment, but to the purpose that every Union citizen and employee would get legal 
protection at the same level, it would be useful even if not to homogenize but to make legal practice more united. In 
this process the basic legal contexts – which I have interpreted above – have decisive role, and to work out the main 
directions of legal differentiation in a much more consequent way than it is today. Finally, I would like to highlight 
the necessity of solving the existing problems with a not only seemingly poetic question: how would it be possible 
to ensure equal rights for the employees even if the standard on which base the Court judges these questions is not 
quite united? We are being kept for the answer… 
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